Headlines around the world have often captured the economic rise of China in vivid details: its ever-expanding industrial output, its rapid increase in the amount of mega-corporations that threatened to upset the status quo (think of Lenovo, Huawei, and Alibaba), and above all, its mass market of consumers, who are only beginning to consume in quantities not hereto imagined. But in this blog post, I want to focus on another core aspect of its economy that perhaps is more crucial for China’s economy in the long run: its labor force.
Mao had famously said something to effect that the more populous a nation is, the more strength that it has. Initially, what he meant to suggest is that because China is so populous, it is able to survive a nuclear confrontation or any other national catastrophes that could have easily crippled other nations. And for a long time, China’s demographic growth had been remarkable, seeming to heed his words, growing from 543 million in 1950 to 814 million in 1970 (see graphs)
, wh
en the median age in the country is only 20. Of course, many nations have growth much fast than this, but for a nation the size of China, the impacts are quite noticeable. However, simply by adding raw number of people to the economy does not suggest that the economy has been growing as well. In fact, in certain years (see graph 2), the economy contracted quite severely during the Mao era. Overall the pace of growth is only from the duration of the period from to .
This lack of growth during the Mao era can be contrasted to the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era, where following a series of liberalizations, the economy had become more robust and dynamic, growing at over 9% percent each year for the period from 1979-2014
. The implementation of economic reforms in the form of special economic zones, etc, helped to propel the economy into new economic heights. Another factor that propels this growth that is often neglected is the so called “demographic dividends”.
The past 35 years had witnessed what is often termed as a demographic dividend, whereby the nation have both low old-age population and low younger generation. This period in a nation’s history (particularly in the case of East Asia, where this effect is the most pronounced) is characterized by high economic growth. For instance, look at the demographic pyramid for 2012. The majority of the population is of working age and contributing to national economic output, at the same time, less economic resources are required to take care the elderly (in the form of healthcare, etc), and less is needed to take care of the young (in the form of education, etc). This saving of resources freed up more capital and labor for the economy, and enabled the phenomenal economic growth that we came to associate with the East Asian countries.
However, one can readily see that there is a catch to this scenario. Population all eventually age and the working population today is the retirees of tomorrow. With a rising share of the elderly, the demographic boom will quickly turn into a demographic bust. In China’s case, this will become an acute problem (see graph)
. Decades from now, when 20, 30 or even 40% of the population is over the age of 65, what do we do then? Economically, the burden will be ever greater on the central government to provide for the elderly, increasing tax burdens on already a smaller working age population. If there is a lesson from the Japanese experience for China, it’s that population is at the center of any comprehensive national development strategy. Failure to take into account the demographic factor will have catastrophic consequences.

This sort of change requires a fundamental shift in the way a society views how their economy should be organized. If we look back at the history of Japan, we see that Japanese society reorganized itself from a feudal agricultural nation into an industrial one in the late 19th century; and post-World War Two, when Japan orientated itself to become an exporting nation, with an emphasis on electronics. These sort of changes did not happen overnight and had to overcome challenges within society, the landowners and domestic industrialists respectively. Also in each case, the government, in the form of a centralized bureaucracy and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), helped to propel the nation into greater economic advancements.


Chinese housing market be at a turning point, and is perhaps already on a road to decline? Recently, I have read that some in China have begun to starting selling their houses, and that those who sells it the most are those with government connections. Perhaps they have some insider information on the Chinese government’s attempts to curb this housing bubble, or that they know something the rest of people in China do not? In terms of policy, I believe the best way to do this is through tightening the credit market, and raising interests rates. Its been well known that the government have been trying to do curb the proliferation of non-performing loans and easy money that is circulating in the country, and if the central bank indeed decided to raise the interest rates, the effects could be extremely profound, not only for the housing market, but for the entire economy. The construction boom occurring in China is fueled by the essentially free-loans that real estate developers have been getting through state-owned banks, many of these using their political connections. And now the housing supply have far outstripped the demand for housing, yet the price remains artificially high, with most of the new buying coming from speculators. In this situation, a crash is inevitable. Many have warned that crash is impending for many years now, yet the market took the warning in stride, perhaps factoring in the risk. Yet investors still believed that the boom is sustainable. In such a situation, even the slightest sell-offs can induce a panic.